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 Recent fourth industrial revolution, industry4.0 results in lot of automation of 
industrial processes and brings intelligence in many home appliances in the 
form of IoT, enhances M2M / D2D communication where electronic devices 
play a prominent role. It is very much necessary to ensure security of those 
devices. To provide reliable authentication and identification of each device 
and to abort the counterfeiting from the unauthorized foundries Physical 
Unclonable Functions (PUFs) emerged as a one of the promising 
cryptographic hardware security solution. PUF is function, mathematically 
modeled by using uncontrollable/ unavoidable random variances of the 
fabrication process of the ICs. These variances can generate unpredictable, 
random responses can be used to overcome the difficulties such as storing the 
keys in non-volatile memories (NVMs) in the classical cryptography. A wide 
variety of PUF architectures such as Arbiter PUFs, Ring oscillator PUFs, 
SRAM PUFs proposed by authors. But due to its design complexity and low 
cost, Delay based Arbiter PUFs (D-PUFs) are considering to be a one of the 
security primitives in authentication applications such as low-cost IoT 
devices for secure key generation. This paper presents a review on the 
different types of Delay based PUF architectures proposed by the various 
authors, sources to exhibit the physical disorders in ICs, methods to estimate 
the Performance metrics and applications of PUF in different domains. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Advances in technology from IT to IoT enhance the usage of electronic devices. Hence electronic 
hardware security emerged as one of the serious challenge due to the penetration of electronic devices in to 
all spheres of people life. At present classical software security mechanisms have certain limitations such as 
storing the secret keys in non-volatile memories such as EEPROM or flash memory. This not only incurs cost 
overhead and also suffers from wide variety of invasive, semi-invasive and non-invasive attacks which 
makes difficult to extract the secret keys [1]-[3]. The remedy to this is storing the secret key or an ID in 
internal memory instead of external memory, the chip can protect from external attacks. To generate the 
unique keys/IDs without involvement of external interaction by using only its inherent characteristics of ICs, 
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) emerged as one of the promising solution, by creating an on chip 
secret keys. 
Fabrication process has certain uncontrollable and unavoidable physical limitations due to which no 
two ICs are identical even they were produced by the same wafer. A PUF is physical system whose 
behaviour is mainly depends upon the intrinsic variations of the manufacturing process of ICs. PUFs are easy 
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to evaluate and very hard to duplicate due to its manufacturing resistant. An input to the PUF is known as 
challenge and corresponding output is treated as a response. The typical characteristics of PUFs 
(reproducible, unique, unclonable.one-way, unpredictable and tamper evident) can be illustrated by Figure 1. 
 
 
  
Figure 1. Properties of an ideal PUF [2] 
 
 
1.1.  Sources of Variability in CMOS PUF technology 
A systematic spatial process variation leads to an imperfections in fabrication process which makes 
every IC is distinctive in its electrical characteristics. And these can be alters from die-to-die, wafer to wafer 
and IC to IC. The typical CMOS process variations during fabrication of an IC as shown in below Figure 2. 
 
 
  
Figure 2. CMOS Process Variations in ICs 
 
 
In Integrated Circuits (ICs) CMOS process parameters are varied during the fabrication process, 
these variations are mainly influence the performance of the whole circuit and type of mismatches 
(variations) are typically divided in two kinds such as global mismatches (MGlobal) which are technology 
dependent and on the other hand, local mismatches (Mlocal) which is technology independent and it can be 
expressed in (1). 
 
MTotal= MGlobal+Mlocal (1) 
 
Global mismatches occur due to random process Manufacturing Variations (PMVs) this mainly 
because of channel length, geometry of transistors (width(w), length(L), Oxide thickness), impurity 
concentration, oxide thickness, threshold voltage (Vt), diffusion depth and electron mobility which are 
inherently present and sensitive to process variations [4]-[6]. On the other side local parameters such as 
environmental variations, Supply voltage and ageing which are drastically effects the performance metrics of 
the PUF. The impact of the variations cannot be controlled completely but these can be minimized. 
Whenever the temperature is increment and supply voltage is reducing, it may affect on diverse parts of the 
circuit which leads to degrade the reliability of PUF [7]-[9]. Ageing also one of the important concerns for 
PUF circuits. As the continuous utilization of the CMOS devices which leads to a progressive degradability 
of the system performance and the mechanisms which alters the performance of CMOS devices are Negative 
bias temperature instability (NBTI), Hot Carrier Injection (HCI), temperature dependent die electric break 
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down (TDDB), positive bias temperature instability (PBTI), electro migration and soft errors are consider as 
a major causes to alter the properties of a ICs [10]-[12]. 
2. RESEARCH METHOD  
A strong PUF is the one whose response is alters continuously with respect to corresponding 
challenges and The quality factor of any PUF architecture can be addressed by a set of PUF metrics such as 
uniquness, reliability, uniformity, ssand tamper resistance. 
 
2.1.  Uniqueness 
It quantifies the dissimilarity of the response bits across different dies, when same challenge is 
applied. Inter chip Hamming Distance (HDinter) is a metric measure of the uniquness. Ideally HD should be 
the 50%.That implies even though the same challenge has been used for 'd'different dies half of the responses 
are differ with each other. The uniqueness can be computed in (2). 
Let Ri and Rj be the n-bit responses generated from two different chips under same challenge. 
 
uniqueness= 2d(d-1)  ∑  d-1 i=1 ∑
HD(RI,RJ)
n
dj=j+1 ×100% (2) 
 
2.2.  Reliability  
It is a measure of stability of PUF responses under various environmental variations, aging and 
noise. An ideal PUF should recreate the exact responses irrespective of the external factors. HDintra is a 
metric that measures the response of a PUF under the same challenge at different fluctuating environmental 
conditions and supply voltage variations. Usually it could be done in two phases: Enrolment phase and 
Regeneration phase. Enrolment phase is process of generating the bit stream, typically at 250c and normal 
supply voltage. While reconstruction phase is done at different temperatures like 00c, 250c, 850c and voltage 
ranging from -5% to +5%., reliability of the PUF is expressed by (3). 
 
HD intra= 1s∑
HD(Ri,Ri',t)
n  ×100%st=1   (3)  
For a device i, its consistency can be assessed by calculating the typical Inter chip Hamming 
Distance (HDintra) of n bit PUF responses. These m responses Rj are collected under m distinct 
environmental conditions. Ri which is collected at nominal operating conditions. 
 
2.3.  Uniformity 
It is an estimation of the randomness of a PUF, and defined as the as a ratio of the ‘0’ to ‘1’ in the 
response bits of a PUF. For an ideal PUF the randomness is should be 50%.mathematicallt it can be 
expressed by (4). 
 
uniformity= 1k∑ ri×100%ki=1  (4)  
k represents the total number of responses and ri is the hamming weight of the ith response. 
 
2.4.  Tamper Resistance 
It is the degree of measure how safe a design to tampering attempts. In a real time the behavior of a 
PUF should alter completely when an adversary changes the structure of a design. it could be expressed using 
the Hamming Distance (HD) between the responses from an authenticate chip (i) and tampered chip (j), 
which is evaluated by (5). 
 
HDavg= 1CRP∑
HD(Ri(l),Rj(l))
n ×CRPi=1 100% (5)  
CRP is the total number of challenge response pairs (CRPs). Ri (l) and Rj (l) are outputs of the 
authenticate and tamper chips respectively. And the modified PUF should distinctly different in terms of 
architecture and behavior. 
 
 
3. DELAY BASED ARBITER BASED PUFs 
An arbiter PUFs were first introduced by Gassend et al. in 2004 [13] by utilizing the intrinsic 
manufacturing variability's of a gate delays. It is a strong PUF, generates the more number of a CRPs 
illustrated by Figure 3. The basic architecture consists of a series of N identical switching (multiplexer) 
elements arranged in top and bottom stages and an arbiter i.e.SR flip-flop/D-latch is connected at its final 
stage to decide the final response. A rising edge of the signal is applied to enable PUF architecture and every 
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switching element is activated by an input challenge vector (C1, C1, C2, C3, ..., Cn) signal can propagate 
either straight or cross according to input stimulus. The final response is evaluated based on the timing signal 
reaches at the input of the arbiter and an arbiter converts the analog timing difference in to the corresponding 
digital value based on the threshold limit. The delay of the multiplexer can be labeled as d1, d2, d3 and d4 as 
shown as Figure 3 (a) and (b).The estimation of the delays of the PUF can be modeled by using the linear 
additive delay model [14]. 
 
 
 
(a) (b)
 
Figure 3. (a) MUX switch (b) Effective contribution of a MUX switch to signal delay 
 
 
  
Figure 4. Arbiter PUF architecture 
 
 
  
Figure 5. Feed Forward-Arbiter PUF architecture 
 
 
By considering the PUF security metrics in to account To ensure the large delay variations Gassend 
[13] proposed a Feed-Forward (FF) arbiter PUF, by introducing an arbiter at intermediate stage of the 
original MUX architecture. The arbiter acts as a switch selector for the further stages to enhancing the circuit 
complexity, thereby improving the uniqueness and randomness[15]. However the reliability of the PUF has 
been degraded at wide range of the temperatures and suffers the reverse engineering attacks such as linear 
programming and combinatorial techniques [16]. Figure 4 illustres the Feed-forward forward arbiter 
architecture. Therefore Instead of the reconfiguring the CRPs directly, by reconfiguring the PUF circuit to 
enhancing performance metrics from the security perspective and also resists the information. leaked from 
each configuration, Yingjie Lao and Keshab K. Parhi [17] proposed a reconfigurable Feed-Forward PUF 
architectures, such as Feed-Forward Overlap (FFO), Feed-Forward Cascade (FFC), Feed-Forward Separate 
(FFS), MUX/DeMUX, Modified FF, Modified FFO, Modified FFC, Modified FFS architectures, (Figure 
5,6,7,8,9,10,11 and 12) whose manufacturing process variations of the transistors can be modeled using the 
Statistical Static Timing Analysis(SSTA )[18] and experiments were done in SPICE 65nm technology by 
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applying Monte-Carlo simulation to estimate the Inter-Chip variations(uniqueness), Intra-Chip variations 
(Reliability) and Randomness(as shown in table-1). 
  
Figure 6. Feed-Forward MUX PUF overlap structure [17] 
 
 
  
Figure 7. Feed-Forward MUX PUF cascade structure [17]. 
 
 
  
Figure 8. Feed-Forward MUX PUF separate structure [17]. 
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Figure 9. MUX/DeMUX PUF [17].  
Table 1. The Performance indicators of the proposed architectures [17]  
Architecture Uniqueness (%) Reliability (%) Randomness (%) 
Original MUX 88.2 94.2 65.6
FFO 95.0 91.3 77.6
FFC 97.5 89.3 84.2
FFS 96.2 90.1 80.6
MFFO 93.5 93.4 74.6
MFFC 95.9 93.0 79.6
MFFS 94.6 93.1 76.8
MUX/DeMUX 83.8 92.9 59.8
 
 
On the other hand, several authors proposed a various architecture and applied different techniques 
to improve the security metrics of the arbiter PUFs. According to Jefferson Capovilla, Mario Cortes, Guido 
Arauj [19] proposed a 32 stage tri-state buffer based arbiter circuit simulated using SPICE AMS 350nm 
technology, described different types of delay design network (Gate drive strength, Gate sizing) techniques as 
well as arbiter design techniques to improve the delay variability of the PUF,From the statistical results 
authors found that use of weak gates can improve the delay variability by a factor of four and instead of SR 
latch based arbiter D-FF arbiter should improve the Hamming Weight Distribution of a PUF. 
 
 
  
Figure 10. Modified Feed-Forward MUX PUF separate structure [17]. 
 
 
  
Figure 11. Modified Feed-Forward MUX PUF overlap structure [17]. 
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Figure 12. Modified Feed-Forward MUX PUF cascade structure [17]. 
  
Figure 13. Modified Feed-Forward MUX PUF separate structure [17]. 
 
 
Anoop Koyily, Chen Zhou [20] proposed a technique in order to measure the PUF metrics 
accurately using Shannon entropy to determine whether PUF is linear or non linear, applied to linear, Feed-
Forward, Modified-Feed Forward 32 bit PUF architectures (experiments done on IBM32nm HKMG 
technology) and observed almost 100% sensitivity and specificity [20].the delay of the any arbiter PUF 
architecture were mainly depends on the device geometry and number of stages. Hence as scaling down the 
technology that leads to a rapid variations in device geometry and which helps to enhance the security 
features of PUF architectures. Songde Hu, Huansheng Ning [21] proposed a 32-stage arbiter PUF 
architecture in 40nm and 65nm technology in cadence virtuoso, simulated by using Monte Carlo analysis 
estimated the uniqueness-42.25% and reliability -78% respectively. As the impact of the process technology 
and scaling down the voltage can significantly improve the uniqueness and sensitivity Lang Lin, Sudheendra 
Srivathsa [22] proposed a 64-bit arbiter PUF on 45nm SOICMOS technology and applied additive linear 
delay model to estimate the delay performance. Uniqueness should be 36.7% and its reliability is (82%) at 
75˚c respectively and also resist the attack such as support vector machine (SVM).To combat the attacks over 
PUFs to enhance authenticity Takanori Machida, Dai Yamamoto [23] proposed a Multi input-Multi output (8 
by 8) PUF design in 90 nm CMOS technology by applying Monte-Carlo analysis to estimate the statistical 
metrics of the switching element and improved the arbiter accuracy. Found the Inter chip Hamming Distance 
(HD) is almost an ideal value (~50%). 
Along with the statistical analysis authors has also implemented the PUF architectures bu using 
FPGAs, Dinesh Ganta and Leyla Nazhandali [24] proposed an architecture called S-ArbRO PUF by 
integrating the arbiter and ring oscillator PUF architecture to analysis the variability and reliability. The 
proposed architecture consisting of a pair of the ring oscillators in each stage instead of the delay paths as a 
results it easy to build in both FPGAs and ASICs. For variability analysis the authors’ implemented 
architecture in Xilinx 90nm Spartan (XC3S500E) FPGAs applied 1.2v supply voltage at 27℃ collected the 
different set of frequencies. For reliability chosen a four different FPGAs subjected to the temperature range 
from 45℃- 65℃ at 1.2 voltage. Found the variability 46% and reliability of 86%, and this architectures can 
also resistant to the modelling attack such as Logistic regression (LR). And Yohei Hori, Takahiro Yoshida 
[25] Implemented the 64-bit arbiter PUF architecture on Xilinx virtex-5 (xc5vlx30-ffg324) FPGAs at core 
voltage of 1.050v and performed the experiment on 1024 times. Found the uniquness-36.75, diffuness-98.36, 
Correctness-98.25, Stediness-98.48 and randomness-84.69. Further to improve the security metrics un 
hardware Takanori Machida, Dai Yamamoto [26] proposed a 3-1 double Arbiter based 64:1 PUF architecture 
in Xilinx vertex5 FPGA. During this design delay element can be used as 3 input XOR gates. From the 
experimental analysis found the uniqueness (~47%), randomness (79%) and steadiness (82%).to enhance the 
reliability P. Klybik and A. A. Ivaniuk [27] designed a 128-stage arbiter PUF architecture in Spartan 3E -
XC3s500e and estimated the reliability (91%) and uniqueness (48%). 
The proposed architecture have significant improve in their performance but suffers from Machine 
learning (ML) attacks. Shuai Chen, Bing Li, Fukui Dan [28] proposed a novel polynomial reconstruction-
based RAPUFs (randomized Arbiter PUFs) scheme to resistant the ML attacks. It was done on four FPGAs 
(vertex-5) and results indicating the 60% accuracy and 100% authenticity. The overall summary of the 
proposed architecture by different authors has described by below table2. 
 
 
 
 
                ISSN: 2089-3272 
Indo. J. Elec. Eng. & Inf, Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2019:  117 – 127 
124
 
Table 2. Summary of different architectures of arbiter PUFs 
Authors Type of a PUF Proposed Mechanism Strengths Weakness
Gassend et al.in[13] Silicon arbiter PUF Linear additive model 1. Circuit has less complexity 
1. Less reliability 
Suffers the modelling 
attacks
Yingjie Lao and Keshab K. 
Parhi [17] 
Feed-Forward 
Overlap(FFO), Feed-
Forward Cascade(FFC), 
Feed-Forward 
Separate(FFS), 
MUX/DeMUX
Gaussian 
distributions(Statistical 
static Timing 
Analysis(SSTA)) 
1. Resist through 
modelling attacks 
2. Provides the better 
uniqueness 
1. Area over head 
2. Unstable CRPS 
Jefferson Capovilla, Mario 
Cortes, Guido Arauj [19] 
Tri-state buffer based 
arbiter PUF 
Addition of a non 
linearity element 
1. Enhances the 
reliability and 
variability
1.Sucesptable to noise 
Takanori Machida, Dai 
Yamamoto[20] 
Multi input multi output 
PUF architecture 
Applied statistical 
static Timing 
Analysis(Monte-Carlo 
analysis)
1. Improved the better 
unpredictability 
1.Incurs area over 
head 
Anoop Koyily, Chen Zhou 
[21] Arbiter PUF Shannon entropy 
1. Improved the 
sensitivity 
2. Identified the better 
Non-linearity
1.Theoritically 
determined 
SongdeHu, Huansheng 
Ning[22] Arbiter PUF 
Applied statistical 
Static Timing 
analysis(Monte-Carlo 
analysis)
1. Estimated Better 
uniqueness and 
reliability 
1. Not directly secured 
from ML attacks 
Implementation of PUFs in FPGAS
Dinesh Ganta and Leyla 
Nazhandali [23] S-ArbRO PUF 
Implemented using 
Xilinx 90nm Spartan 
(XC3S500E) FPGAs 
1. Reduction of number 
of gates 
2. Incresed delay 
variability
1. More resist to the 
Machine learning 
attacks 
Yohei Hori, Takahiro 
Yoshida [24] Arbiter PUF 
Xilinx virtex-5 
(xc5vlx30-ffg324) 
FPGAs
1. Incresed the channel 
length bit 1. Difficult to measure 
Takanori Machida, Dai 
Yamamoto [25] 
Double arbiter based 
PUF 
Xilinx virtex-5 
(xc5vlx30-ffg324) 
FPGAs
1. Incresed the no of 
non linear elements 
1. Reliabilty is 
decreases 
V. P. Klybik and A. A. 
Ivaniuk [26] 
Non lineararbiterPUF 
architecture
Xilinx 
Spartan 3E XC3s500e
1. Incresed the channel 
length bit
1. Sensitivity 
decreases
Shuai Chen, Bing Li, Fukui 
Dan [27] 
 
polynomial 
reconstruction-based 
RAPUFs(randomized 
Arbiter PUFs)
Xilinx vertex-5 
FPGAs 
1. Improves CRPs 
inters of uniqueness 
and reliability 
1. unstable CRPs 
Lang Lin, 
SudheendraSrivathsa [28] Arbiter PUF architecture 
1. linear additive delay 
model (SOI CMOS 
Technology)
1. Improved reliability 1. less uniqueness 
 
 
4. APPLICATIONS OF PUF 
4.1.  Low-cost device authentication  
Due to its simple structure PUFs are used as an attractive choice for low cost authentication instead 
of applying the cryptographic algorithms such as data encryption and decryption [29]. As the generated 
output from PUF is unique and hard to predict for each IC. Hence it is can be identified by simply storing the 
PUF output in database and compared with the regenerated response. However a single PUF response cannot 
be used for device authentication.  
Figure 13 depicts the overview of the PUF based authentication process. A PUF can acts as a "black 
box" due to its intrinsic properties generates unpredictable set of responses and has N number of CRPs whose 
response is unique for every challenge. Therefore, the authentication process is carried out, during the 
manufacturing of IC the trusted party stores its CRPs table in a secret server/data base, And PUF is given to 
the client. In order to verify the authenticity of an IC later, a client requests the server, server picks the set of 
random challenges and sent to the client. The client runs challenges on the PUF and submits the response to 
the server for authentication purpose. Server checks the responses ,compares with the CRPs in the server. If 
the observed response is near sufficient to the response in data base then verification is fruitful, otherwise it 
fails. To avoid the attacks from adversary CRPs can be utilized only once in each PUF and must be erased 
from database after verification. 
 
 
Indo. J. Elec. Eng. & Inf ISSN: 2089-3272  
 
A secure arbiter physical unclonable functions (PUFs) for device authentication … (Anil Kumar Kurra) 
125
  
Figure 14. PUF based Authentication [29] 
 
 
4.2.  Secret key generation: 
Intrinsic PUFs can utilizes the inevitable manufacturing process variations which can be used as 
secret key generations. The fact that generated key (PUF response) should be stable over the number of read 
outs, but due to is noisy, error prone and limited amount of entropy, PUF responses cannot be used 
straightforwardly as a cryptographic key. This problem can be overcome by using the two-phase algorithm 
(key generation phase and key extraction phase) as shown in Figure 15(a) and (b). While initial key 
generation phase PUF output is combined with an additional information it is often called helper data. Both 
are stored in secure server/data base by the verifier. In extraction phase the verifier presents the helper data to 
an algorithm which extract the same key from the PUF as in the key generation phase. In this way PUF and 
verifier have shares a secret key, even if the helper data is publicly communicated from the verifier, the key 
has perfectly secret. In this scenario it is often called physically obscured keys. 
 
 
  
Figure 15. (a) Cryptographic key Generation in Enrolment phase 
 
 
  
Figure 15. (b) Cryptographic key Generation in reconstruction phase 
4.3.  PUF in IoT Security: 
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Over the last decade IoT (Internet of Things) systems are emerged as one of the most spectacular 
phenomenon, it encompass billions of devices, each device is able to authenticate each other before sending 
or receiving the data. Traditional encryption techniques cannot be suitable for the IoT devices due to memory 
and power processing constrains. If conventional encryption techniques were applied to the IoT devices, it 
requires the huge memory space to store the secret keys and also it suffers different kinds of attacks such as 
invasive and semi invasive attacks, and also it requires huge power to process the data. Moreover providing 
the high level of security to the IoT devices using tamper sensitive circuitry it consumes more energy and 
expensive. Hence it clearly describes the current security primitives are not suitable for providing security to 
the IoT devices. PUFs on other hand provides an efficient and low-cost solution to the IoT security systems, 
without need of the storing the keys in devices, due to their random nature of the behaviour. Figure 16 
illustrates the PUF based authentication in IoT devices. 
 
 
  
Figure 16. PUF based security authentication in IoT 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we focused on different configurations of a delay based arbiter PUF architectures, by 
utilizing its random variations can be used as security metrics to identify and authenticate the recycled, 
overproduced, remarked ICs with low cost. The architectures were evaluated by different types of a 
mechanisms such as additive linear delay model, Gaussian distribution (SSTA), Shannon entropy etc. By 
reviewing the litreture review it was indicated that simulated using the CAD tools, at different technologies 
(350, 90, 65, 45) nm and, FPGAs (Spartan 3E, vitex-5) were used to validate these architectures. From the 
above literature survey found that delay is mainly influence the number of stages and technology parameters 
(W/L). In contrast to the delay based PUF architectures, mentioned different types of attacks PUFs and their 
impact on reliability, uniqunessand and randomness. Based on the reviewing the previous configurations, Tri-
state buffer based arbiter PUF in the acoustic enviroments is the most effective architecthures, but in the 
noisy conditions multi input multi output PUF architectures are suggested. Future work mainly directed 
towards the improvement of the security metrics and tarnish modeling attacks respectively. 
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